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1 INRODUCTION
Faults in one subsystem of an automated plant have
often undesired effects on other subsystems if reme-
dial actions are not taken promptly after a fault oc-
curs. Dependability of a control system can be ob-
tained by giving it ability to detect and isolate faults
and react with actions that accommodate the control
system to the fault. Fault accommodation is prede-
termined at the design stage: a control system can
freeze to a safe state or the controller can be re-
configured. This can be done e.g. by replacing the
measured signal from a faulty sensor by an estimate
obtained from remaining available signals, together
with known analytic relations of the particular part
of the plant.
Handling of faults in open loop systems is techni-
cally straightforward, but the reactions used to ac-
commodate a fault need to be designed with careful
consideration to safety and availability of the total
plant. Optimization at a local level may easily vio-
late an overall safety goal. Handling of faults in
closed loop components is a more difficult and
challenging task. Properly designed systems can ac-
commodate the effects of faults whereas less careful
designs can let fault effects propagate to other sub-
systems.
Analysis of failure of parts of a system is a classi-
cal discipline, and the failure mode and effects
analysis (FMEA) is widely used and appreciated in
industry. The FMEA method was developed as a
mainly manual approach which was then suggested
computerized (Lege 1978, Herrin 1981, Yuan 1985,
Bell 1989). The traditional FMEA approach does not
support the handling of faults in automated systems
where the ultimate goal is autonomous handling of a
fault to obtain continued operation of a plant. A for-
mal link to fault detection and isolation (FDI) mod-
els was suggested in (Blanke 1996), (Blanke et al.
1997). These papers dealt with the algebraic de-
scription of fault propagation analysis. A further de-
velopment with case studies was done by Bøgh
(1998).
A conclusion of this and other case studies was
that dedicated tools would be needed to cope with
complexity and assure correctness of analysis and
later implementation.
The present paper presents a development effort
to automate the analysis using an object oriented ap-
proach to the design of a prototype tool for auto-
mated analysis of fault propagation.
2 THE FMEA MATRIX
For the reasons given above, fault analysis needs to
incorporate analysis throughout a system. In order to
do this a component-based method was introduced
(Blanke 1996), in which possible component faults
are identified at an early stage of design. The method
uses an FMEA description of components as a
starting point. The lowest level of analysis, in this
context, this is sensors, valves, motors and similar
components. Programmable parts are considered as
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ABSTRACT: Advances in automation have provided integration of monitoring and control functions to en-
hance the operator's overview and ability to take remedy actions when faults occur. Automation in plant su-
pervision is technically possible with integrated automation systems as platforms, but new design methods are
needed to cope efficiently with the complexity and to ensure that the functionality of a supervisor is correct
and consistent. In particular these methods are expected to significantly improve fault tolerance of the de-
signed systems. The purpose of this work is to develop a software module implementing an automated tech-
nique for Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA). This technique is based on the matrix formulation of
FMEA for the investigation of failure propagation through a system. As main result, this technique will pro-
vide the design engineer with decision tables for fault handling that show how fault migration can be stopped.
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consisting of separate function blocks that can be
treated similarly to physical components in the
analysis, bearing in mind that their properties may be
changed by software modifications if so desired. All
potential faults and their effects are determined.
An FMEA scheme for each component shows
how fault effects out of the component relate to
faults at inputs, outputs, or parts within the compo-
nents. This is illustrated in (1).
Using fci for component faults and eci for the ef-
fects, the FMEA scheme can be expressed as:
(1)
where Afi
 
is a Boolean matrix representing the
propagation. The index 'i' is a component identifier
and ⊗ the inner product disjunction operator. The
operation carried out by the operator is equivalent to
the scalar Boolean disjunction "∨" and the inner
product to the "∧", i.e., row no. k of (1) is:
(2)
When some faults are effects propagated from other
components, we get:
(3)
System descriptions are obtained from interconnec-
tion of component descriptions. The description of a
system with three components and open loop struc-
ture is:
(4)
The combined fault-effect description for this exam-
ple is constructed in three steps:
(5)
Effects are seen to be propagated to the next level of
analysis and act as parts' faults at that level. This is
continued until the system level is reached. The
schemes give a surjective mapping from faults to ef-
fects: there is a unique path from fault to end effect,
but several different faults may cause the same end
effect.
Reversal is obtainable through finding the gener-
alized transpose Ab of Af.  The matrices Af and Ab are
each other's pseudo inverse in the Boolean sense.
When there is no feedback involved, the result is the
capability of isolation of fault effects at any level.
The FMEA scheme for a set of components con-
nected in a closed loop is principally described as:
(6)
Looking at the logic operation of this equation, it is
obvious that the solution, if it exists, is:
(7)
The implication is that an automated analysis will
need to consider closed loops as special cases. The
interpretation of a closed loop in a fault-propagation
analysis is merely the observation that closed loop
operation may amplify or attenuate the effect of a
fault. Which of the two happens depends on the dy-
namic properties of the control loop. This question
can not be answered by the simple Boolean matrix
analysis.
In the design tool, it was chosen to automatically
locate closed logical loops, let the user cut them
open and automatically create additional elements of
the faults and effects vectors. Mathematically, this
means to replace (6) by:
(8)
where e2ci and f2ci are the fault vector and the effects
vector elements, respectively, of the signals at the
place where a loop has been cut open. It is noted that
each of the two vectors can have multiple elements.
The user will manually need to investigate these
additional faults and effects, treating them as extra
input faults and output effects of the subsystem con-
sidered.
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3 A PROTOTYPE TOOL FOR AUTOMATED
ANALYSIS
Using this method, a module for performing auto-
mated FMEA has been carried out. This module is
integrated within a tool, the Prototype Design Tool
(PDT), which supplies a graphical user interface
(GUI) for the definition of the system using a dedi-
cated component library. This is a database of com-
ponents including graphical image, attributes, be-
havior description when failure occurs and
mathematical models. An overview of the PDT can
be found in Figure 1.
In the users’ eyes the design tool is a GUI with views
and interactive features. Sub-components of this
GUI are distributed among the parts of several mod-
ules of the PDT. The users are able to interactively
change working context.
By this GUI the user can build a new system topol-
ogy (or load a previously stored one since serializa-
tion is supplied) and then perform the FMEA analy-
sis on it.
Figure 1. Overview of the PDT.
The FMEA module can be launched within the PDT
once that the system topology is completed. The
FMEA module supports an independent GUI that
allows the user to perform the following interactive
actions:
1 Identification of closed loops.
2 Cut of closed loops (the user can decide where
to cut).
3 Restoration of the cut connections.
4 Calculation of FMEA matrix of the system and
performing reverse analysis.
When a closed loop is identified in the topology the
user is able to open it. So, when all the closed loops
are cut, the analysis of the open system can be car-
ried out.
If the component is a brand new one, the user will
be requested to fill the FMEA matrix of each com-
ponent of the topology, and he can also decide to
change the failures that can affect a component and,
hence, be eventually propagated forward.
At the end of these operations, the automated
analysis can be carried out.
Figure 2. Main GUI of the PDT.
Figure 3. Flowchart of the main operations performed by the
FMEA Module.
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The result of the analysis is the whole FMEA matrix
of the system, which establishes a relationship be-
tween faults and end effects of the system (including
the additional faults and effects, which are generated
by the cut of the closed loops).
Reverse analysis can be performed and it is pos-
sible to highlight the propagation path of each fault.
The result is that, for each end effect of the system, it
is possible to have a list of all the faults, which gen-
erate this end effect, and a consequent list of all the
components involved in the propagation of each of
these faults. In this way, the user is able to edit the
FMEA matrix of the components eligible to imple-
ment the blocking of failure propagation (i.e. pro-
grammable ones), and modify the matrix accord-
ingly. In the actual programmable function block,
this would imply that fault detection and isolation is
applied to the particular signal and that remedial ac-
tion is made in software to accommodate the fault.
Figure 4. GUI representing the list of fault related to a selected
end effect.
Figure 5. GUI representing the list of component crossed by the
propagation of a selected fault.
This technique is a basic design methodology for
construction of fault-tolerant systems in both plant
monitoring and control.
In Figure 2 the main GUI of the PDT tool in
which the user can build or load a topology and
launch the FMEA Module is represented. A flow-
chart of the main operations performed by the
FMEA Module is shown in Figure 3, while Figure 4
and Figure 5 show the GUIs for the representation of
the results of the reverse analysis.
4 IMPLEMENTATION
4.1 Object Oriented Model
The FMEA module and the entire PDT has been de-
signed following the Object Oriented Programming
(OOP) paradigm, and the JavaTM has been chosen as
the implementation language. The Java source code
has been compiled using version 1.1.5 of the Java
Developer Kit (JDK) and Swing 1.0.3 has been
adopted for aiming the development of the GUI.
The core of the FMEA module is a multithreading
application in which all the fault propagations can
run contemporary in a multithreaded environment.
The relationships among the main classes of the
FMEA Module are shown in Figure 6.
Figure 6. Relationships among the main classes of the FMEA
Module.
4.2 Implementation description
The basic idea is that the components of the topol-
ogy which have intrinsic failures or input failures
external to the system are considered as starting
points for the analysis. In the same way the compo-
nents that have output connections with elements not
belonging to the topology under analysis are consid-
ered as target points. In this case the failures propa-
gated through these connections constitute the ef-
AnComponent
Analysis
AnalysisEditor
AnalysisEditorGUI
Matrix ResultGUI
AnComponentGUI
fects of failures at topology level, and hence, the tar-
get of the failure propagation analysis.
An object manager has the task of collecting the
results and building the whole FMEA matrix of the
system.
Each component object knows its origins and
destinations, i.e. the components with which it is
connected in input and output, and, independently
from the others, verifies if it has any failure (intrinsic
or input ones), i.e. if a start origin is found. If this
check has a positive outcome the propagation for
that fault starts, and the failure is spread through the
system, according to its corresponding row of the
FMEA matrix of the component. The component
which receives this fault executes the propagation
operations, sending it to other components with its
original identifier. This action is performed until a
target component is reached and the result is col-
lected by the manager. A flowchart, which explains
this operation of propagation, is given in Figure 7.
Figure 7. Flowchart of the propagation algorithm.
The Manager object knows all the information about
the topology. This information can be represented as:
1. Identifiers of all the components of the topol-
ogy: the PDT module has a method by which the
Manager can get all these univocal.
2. Connections between components: for every
component the PDT module gives all the informa-
tion about the components connected in input and
output.
3. Inner failure matrices: for every component the
user is able to edit the inner failure matrix by a dedi-
cated GUI.
4. Faults of the components: for each component
the user can add a fault, so a row is added to the fail-
ure matrix and the component become a starting
point for this new fault (in the same way a fault can
be removed from a component).
5. Opening of closed loops: for each closed loop
the user is able to decide where to open it, so the
Manager adds new inputs (practically new faults, but
“fictitious” ones) to the component placed where the
loop has been cut, and also new fictitious end effects
are considered for the topology.
Another basic interface between FMEA module
and the PDT module is the one regarding the seriali-
zation phase. In fact the Topology object of the PDT
module has a reference to the Matrix object of the
FMEA module. In this object the FMEA module
stores the information added by the user and the one
obtained as a result of the analysis phase (i.e. the
global FMEA matrix), this information regards:
1. Inner failure matrices of the single compo-
nents.
2. Names of input and output variables of the
components
3. FMEA matrix of the system.
When the PDT serializes the current topology, all
this information is serialized together with the topol-
ogy.
5 THE LINK TO FAULT DETECTOR DESIGN
The above analysis provides a list of al fault effects
which are required to be detected. This has been ob-
tained using a consistent method throughout the
analysis, so completeness is guaranteed to the extent
that component failure models are complete. This
does not provide completeness in a mathematical
sense. It is, however, as good as other reliability as-
sessments using well established failure mode de-
scriptions of components.
The list of effects to be detected is used in the de-
sign of fault detection. Simple means to detect single
sensor faults were treated by Blanke et al. (1997),
When redundant information is needed to detect
more complicated faults, analytical FDI can be em-
ployed. A recent reference among many good books
is Gertler (1998).
Automatic generation of the entire modeling for
FDI is a research topic, and at present, the FDI filters
need to be designed using an engineering effort. The
list of faults to detect, and the required actions to ac-
commodate a fault, as provided by the PDT is an
important step forward.
Component object 
created by the 
Manager
Fault 
origin ?
Fault
 propagation
End of 
propagation
?
Setting of FMEA 
matrix for this fault
YES
NO
NO YES
6 CONCLUSIONS
The paper has introduced the concept of automated
analysis of fault propagation using FMEA descrip-
tions of components as the basis for the analysis. A
technique to cope with the problem of logic analysis
of fault propagation for closed loops was suggested
and tested in the prototype tool. Experience from
case studies using the prototype tool has shown the
feasibility of the approach.
The salient feature of this approach is that ability
to make a reverse analysis. This enables the designer
to pinpoint the faults with high severity and deter-
mine where the propagation of a fault can be
stopped. This in turn shows exactly which faults
should be detected and by which programmable
components this should be done. It also shows to the
designer which remedial actions should be taken
(automatically) to accommodate a particular fault.
A second generation prototype tool with further in-
tegration between topology definition and enhanced
facilities for user interaction will be a natural next
step. Simultaneously, application on larger test cases
will bring the tool closer to industrial use.
7 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This work was partially funded by the ATOMOS
project under EU DG7 contract no. WA-95-SC.205.
REFERENCES
Bell, T.E. 1989. Managing Murphy's Law: Engineering a
Minimum-Risk System. IEEE Spectrum, June 1989.
Blanke, M. 1996. Consistent Design of Dependable Control
Systems. Control Engineering Practice, 4(9): 1305-1312.
Blanke, M., R. Izadi-Zamanabadi, S.A. Bøgh & C.P. Lunau
1997. Fault Tolerant Control - A Holistic View. Control
Engineering Practice, 5(5): 693-70.
Bøgh, S.A. 1998. Fault-tolerant Control Systems - Development
Method and Real Life Case Study. Ph.D. dissertation, De-
partment of Process Control, Aalborg University, Denmark.
Borch, O., M. Blanke, J. Buck, F. Bagnoli & T.F. Lootsma
1998. ATOMOS II Prototype Design Tool. EU ATOMOS
project, task 2.6.3 report.
Bagnoli F. & G. Allasia 1998. FMEA software documentation
and demonstration of prototype FMEA software. EU
ATOMOS project, task 2.6.2 report.
Gertler, J. 1998. Fault detection and Diagnosis in Engineering
Systems. Marcel Decker.
Herrin S.A. 1981. Maintainability Applications Using the Matrix
FMEA Technique. IEEE Trans. on Reliability, 30(3).
Lege J.M. 1978. Computerized Approach for Matrix-Form
FMEA. IEEE Trans. on Reliability. 27(1): 154-157.
Veillette, R.J., J.V. Medanic, & W.R. Perkins 1992. Design of
Reliable Control Systems. IEEE Trans. Automatic Control,
37(3): 290-304.
Yuan, J. 1985. Strategy to Establish a Reliability Model with De-
pendent Components through FMEA. Reliability Engineer-
ing. 11(1): 37-45.
